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Cape Verde: Marketing Good Governance 
Bruce Baker 
Abstract: Faced with a lack of natural resources Cape Verde has made good 
governance one of its most marketable products. Running parallel to the 
institutionalisation of democratic politics there has been an overhaul and 
growing sophistication in public administration, though certain weaknesses 
persist. This report argues that it is reform and improvement in this area in 
particular that has enabled this small island state to punch above its weight 
and achieve remarkable social, economic and political results. But will the 
successful formula of the past decade prove sufficient for the future? Pov-
erty and unemployment have by no means been conquered. Much of the 
economic growth has been based in the tourist sector and the government is 
well aware of the dangers of over-reliance on a single industry. Cape Verde’s 
midway location between South America and Europe and its increasing 
international transport connections will continue to offer advantages to drug 
traffickers. The next few years of the world financial crisis will show whether 
marketing good governance is enough and whether this is the model for 
small resource developing states. 
  Manuscript received September 14, 2009; accepted September 28, 2009 
Keywords: Cape Verde; State; Economy; Society; Good governance 
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The global economy favours those states with developed economies, pref-
erably supported by large home markets and abundant natural resources. In 
the political arena, too, size still counts in terms of influence. Set against 
these criteria for success, Cape Verde has few natural advantages. It is a 
small archipelago of 10 islands, 300 miles off the coast of West Africa, has a 
population of just 530,000 people, has no natural resources, little drinking 
water and suffers frequent droughts. Yet this same state has seen over 7 per 
cent economic growth every year from 2005-8. Total foreign direct invest-
ment that was 400m Euros in 2005, is expected to be some 2,000m Euros in 
2009. It is the only state in Africa, apart from Botswana, to have moved 
from Least Developed Country (LDC) status to Middle-Income Country 
(MIC) status. Further, it is the only country in Africa to have negotiated a 
special status with the EU (European Union) beyond the limited economic 
Cotonou Agreement between ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States and the EU. On most indicators it outstrips sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) averages. Its life expectancy at birth is 71 (SSA average being 51); 
infant mortality per 1,000 live births is 25 (SSA: 94); literacy over 15 years is 
81 per cent (SSA: 59); and gross primary enrolment is 106 per cent of school 
age population (SSA: 94).  
In the 1990s, during the African wave of democratisation, Cape Verde 
was the first country to abandon one party rule and to hold multi-party elec-
tions. Many African “transitions” proved to be a false dawn, but Cape Verde 
has progressed steadily, so that it is now widely regarded as the best democ-
ratic state in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of its nearest rivals, South Africa, 
Mauritius and São Tomé e Príncipe (Baker 2006). Freedom House gave it a 
1 for political rights and 2 for civil liberties between 1993 and 2003; and 
since then has given it 1.1 (Freedom House 2008).  
Upon independence in 1975 the African Party for the Independence of 
Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência do Cabo Verde, PAICV; then 
known as the African Party for the Independence and Union of Guinea and 
Cape Verde or PAIGC) took power and was constitutionally the sole legal 
political party from 1980. Despite its socialist rhetoric and loose alliance 
with the Soviet bloc, the PAIGC was in fact pragmatic in policy. From the 
mid-1980s the PAICV gradually embraced political liberalisation (Andrade 
2002) realising that Cape Verde’s survival could only be assured by main-
taining an open international policy. The collapse of communism only con-
firmed the danger of having no more than one source of support and of the 
need to strengthen assistance from the Diaspora and European states by 
opening up politically (Meyns 2002). The PAICV moved rapidly to abandon 
the one party state and called legislative elections for January 1991 and a 
presidential election for February. The transition, therefore, was an elite 
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negotiated transition settlement, rather than the outcome of popular pres-
sure.  
People were ready for change and the newly formed opposition party, 
the Movimento para a Democracia (MpD) won control of the legislature and the 
presidency, not just in 1991, but in the following legislative/presi-dential 
elections of 1995/6. In 2001, however, weakened by internal struggles, the 
MpD narrowly lost to a rejuvenated PAICV in the case of the presidential 
election, Pires of the PAICV winning by just 12 votes. The 2006 election 
repeated that result, President Pires this time winning by 2,856 votes. In the 
short period since 1990, therefore, there have been two transfers of political 
power to the opposition.  
Running parallel to the institutionalisation of democratic politics there 
has been an overhaul and growing sophistication in public administration, 
though certain weaknesses persist. This report argues that it is reform and 
improvement in this area in particular that has enabled this small island state 
to punch above its weight and achieve such social, economic and political 
development. The report examines seven areas of governance.1  
Public Scrutiny  
Corruption in Cape Verde is deemed by most to be small. It is rated 3rd in 
Africa behind Botswana and Mauritius in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
2008 (Transparency International). Yet corruption is not unknown. In 2007, 
for instance, the Minister of the Economy had to resign over accusations 
concerning a tourism contract with a Portuguese company.2  
The absence of gross corruption is due in part to an increasing level of 
public scrutiny. This should not be exaggerated, for news management is a 
well known tool for governments to shape the agenda and exert hegemonic 
control and Cape Verde is not immune to this. Senior figures in both the 
opposition press and the state-run television station, TCV (TV Nacional de 
Cabo Verde), tell of their junior journalists having to be encouraged to de-
velop independent thought and be less dependent on reporting the activities 
                                                 
1  This report is based on interviews conducted in late 2008 with some 30 key infor-
mants in central and local government executives and assemblies, business, civil 
servants, media, human rights groups, women’s groups, trade unions and educa-
tionists. All quotes are from these interviews if not indicated otherwise. The author 
is very grateful to the British Academy for a grant towards the research. The re-
search was conducted along with Professor Roy May of Coventry University, to 
whom the author is indebted for critical comments on the text. 
2  The government cancelled the contract, but says it found no evidence of corrup-
tion. 
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of government officials and on official press releases. They were encourag-
ing their organisations to investigate the serious issues of current popular 
concern and urging them not to allow fear of the government to dictate the 
subject matter of news reports. For the government-funded TCV, of course, 
subject matter is more problematic. As one editor put it: “I am allowed to 
think freely, but not allowed to have my free thinking financed!”; implying 
that where there was only an administrative budget and not a production 
budget, it could always be argued that no special resources could be found 
for programmes other than those deemed helpful to the governing party. It 
might be thought that the new private commercial television stations would 
be freer to tackle topics of public interest, however controversial, but the 
evidence is that financial constraints have led them to allow commercial 
companies to place news of their activities and products within “news and 
information” items.  
The National Assembly is also responsible for public scrutiny, but 
tends to react to scandal rather than expose it through its own investiga-
tions. Thus the problems with the national airline, TACV (Transportes Aéreos 
de Cabo Verde, S.A.), were only examined by the government and the Na-
tional Assembly after press criticism. Yet measuring the effectiveness of the 
National Assembly is open to different interpretations. Defenders can point 
to the summoning of ministers to the Assembly to answer criticism, lively 
debates and delays to bills when no cross-party consensus can be reached. 
On the other hand, as one ex-minister perceptively observed, much of the 
criticism in the National Assembly is criticism for criticism’s sake and no 
more than political posturing. Few doubt that, had the National Assembly 
been more alert, the mistakes over the privatisation of public utilities like 
water and electricity in the early 1990s would not have been made. Uncritical 
acceptance of sales to Portuguese firms gave them private monopolies that 
did not serve consumers well. 
Public scrutiny, therefore, has some way to go, but it is worth recording 
that the State is active in promoting political criticism through its financial 
support for all registered newspapers and opposition parties and to human 
rights groups. And, in the long term, the government’s decision to insert 
human rights education into the school curriculum may be one of the most 
significant steps forward in terms of freedom of speech being embodied 
into the national culture and unimpeded by political agendas. 
E-government  
One of the biggest upheavals in public administration in recent years has 
been electronic government. Government data bases are being integrated 
  Cape Verde: Marketing Good Governance 139
 

 
and made available to the public and international bodies. It is already pos-
sible for citizens to print off copies of important documents like birth cer-
tificates, to access the government budget, to examine electoral rolls, to 
register companies and vehicles, and to visit an increasing number of minis-
try websites for information and enquiries. Beyond that, through integrating 
the financial income and expenditure of all government ministries, ministers 
and international financial institutions (IFIs) can track the current state of 
the finances by sector or as a whole, according to one single set of IFI re-
quired indicators. Within government there has not only been the wide-
spread use of computers and internet services, but an intra-net that records 
and allows appropriate access to all important government documents and 
publications. According to one assessment, in Africa Cape Verde is second 
only to Botswana in the quality of its e-government (West 2008).  
As an exercise in enhancing government management, government in-
tegration, government transparency, government access and government-
public communication, this has been transformative. The commitment in 
terms of supportive infrastructure (not only computers and data bases, but 
the demanding system of electronically gathering statistics and tracking) has 
been expensive, but the outcome has enhanced citizen access to govern-
ment; and, for the economy, has reduced transaction costs and improved 
global connectivity. 
The State Transformation Agenda  
Good governance is seen by the Cape Verde government as having market 
value. It is a resource that attracts outside investors, IMF (International 
Monetary Fund) loans and improved US security ratings. Hence there is a 
Minister of State Reform working in the Prime Minister’s office with re-
sponsibility for the transformation agenda at the institutional level. 
There had been widespread agreement amongst the political elite dur-
ing the transition of 1990-1 that the state should withdraw from the econ-
omy through privatisation and adopt a lean administration. Yet the poor 
performance of the privatised electricity and water companies led to a re-
view of the state regulatory function and agreement that the country must 
go beyond an “aid recycling” economy. The current government is now 
promoting a small “but still social’ state. As Christina Fontes, the Minister of 
State Reform, articulates it: “we now want a state that creates wealth and not 
just one that is a good manager of aid”.  
Beyond that there is a concerted effort being made both to review state 
requirements and to ensure state integration. In the realm of security the 
government accepted that the new security threats were organised crime, 
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particularly drug trafficking from South America en route to Europe, and 
also money laundering. Hence it transformed the state defence force into 
two main corps: the coastal guard and a national guard to support the police. 
It is also seeking to co-ordinate the response to the threats across the min-
istries of justice, defence, and internal administration. Thus tougher laws on 
money laundering (2002 and 2008) have accompanied proposed reforms to 
the police and criminal justice system and the strengthening of the coast 
guard in partnership with the EU.3  
Another area of government integration has been external investment 
and the processes of validation and registration required by the government 
of those seeking to set up a business. The government claims an increase in 
business friendliness and that a “one day” registration of new businesses is 
available, though this is disputed by some.4  
Human Resource Capacity  
Public administration can only be effective as long as there is human capac-
ity to deliver the policies. The government claim they are well aware of the 
need to match education skills with the economy, but the administration is 
struggling to meet those needs and teachers complain of an out of date edu-
cation system. There are real problems in recruiting those with public ad-
ministration skills at the highest level, despite some success in bringing back 
Cape Verdeans from abroad. One former minister identified capacity build-
ing as the biggest challenge to democracy, arguing that knowledge was the 
vital ingredient for decision making.  
The country relies heavily on tourism, yet the Ministry of the Environ-
ment seems helpless to stop contractors stealing sand from the Santiago 
island beaches or of protecting the Malagueta National Park on the island 
from new building construction. In terms of planned development the Min-
ister of Decentralisation, Housing and Urban Planning admits that she can 
do little to stop the illegal homes being built around Praia.5 In the education 
sector, administrators in education report that there is very little control and 
                                                 
3  The number of organised drug and money laundering cases rose from 19 in 2007 to 
60 in 2008. In the last 4 years 12 accounts worth more than US$1 million have been 
frozen and since 2007 the government has seized US$1.6 million worth of land, 
homes and cars (IRIN 3 November 2008). 
4  The Doing Business data base claims that on average it still takes 12 steps to start 
up a business and 52 days; see: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/subnatio 
nal/DB2009_Small_Island_developing_states.pdf.>. 
5  IRIN 6 November 2008. 
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inspection and quality assurance over the private universities. Meanwhile the 
Minister of Justice, faced with rising violent crimes, argues:  
“Crime is not only a problem of security; it is also about drugs, un-
employment, port control, education, human rights, a growing income 
gap, police and security infrastructure. We need to reform it all to hit 
on the answer”.6  
However the country’s maritime ports are still not equipped to scan ship-
ments for weapons. And the head of high-level crime investigations in the 
judicial police claims that, though they often know who the drug traffickers 
and money launderers are, they do not have the resources to catch them. 
For instance the crime laboratory has limited chemical analysis capabilities.7 
The Polícia de Ordem Pública have appeared to be so overwhelmed and inef-
fective in the face of this urban crime increase that the government brought 
in the military police in 2007 to do night patrols in Praia.  
In other areas of the economy there are also signs of skilled labour 
shortages. In the expanding tourist industry the government speaks of aim-
ing for one million visitors by 2020, which will require large numbers to 
service it. Though it is reluctant to admit it, ultimately only migrant workers 
can provide the additional staff. 
Gender Relations  
Domestic relations have always been the most impervious to external gov-
ernance. The constitution is clear on gender equality, but according to many, 
sexism still prevails. The beating of wives is widely regarded as normal; the 
exploitation of young teenage girls by “big daddies” is defended by some 
families as providing economic security rather than being a crime; and many 
women still accept violence with a resigned, “he could be worse”.  
The workplace is also infused with discrimination and gender stereo-
typing of jobs. Thus in 2004 only 10 per cent of magistrates and 13 per cent 
of transport workers were women, but 64 per cent of domestic workers and 
64 per cent of teachers. There is also labour exploitation of female workers, 
particularly those in the informal sector, although even in the formal sector 
women are often afraid to insist on their legal rights when the unemploy-
ment rate is at least 18 per cent. 
Despite these persistent problems, there has been a concerted effort by 
the government to reduce inequality and there are signs of real progress. 
                                                 
6  IRIN 1 December 2008. 
7  IRIN 3 November 2008. 
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The principal driver for change is the government agency, Instituto Cabo-
verdiano para Igualdade e Equidade de Genero. It actively seeks equality for 
women in the government, the National Assembly, and the offices of mu-
nicipal mayors and municipal assembly leaders. So successful has it been that 
there are now eight women as opposed to seven men in the cabinet (it was 
six in 2006); 21 per cent of the National Assembly are women (it was 11 per 
cent in 2001); there are now two women mayors; and 30 per cent of the 
municipal assemblies are women. There are also ongoing efforts to ensure that 
in two ministries directors of departments write gender into their agendas.  
Although the law still only criminalises “bad treatment of a spouse”, 
the number of women reporting abuse to the police is rising. As an agent of 
change the agency has been forming local networks that offer victims a 
quicker, faster and more effective response. These networks consist of the 
police, hospital doctors, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), public 
attorneys, the National Human Rights Directorate, and the National Insti-
tute of the Child and Adolescent. Journalists have also been targeted to 
reflect on how they transmit information about women and the agency 
makes full use of radio broadcasts. The trans-agency and public-private 
approach to promoting social change appears to maximise its effectiveness.  
Central-local and Inter-island Relations 
Inter-island governance is universally prickly when it comes to the distribu-
tion of national wealth and development projects. Despite a government 
formula that takes into account land area and population size, those on is-
lands other than Santiago, where Praia the capital is, feel overlooked. This is 
especially so if their representatives are members of the opposition MpD. 
Underneath the politicking, however, there is an issue of the nature of the 
centre-margin relationship. Municipalities on islands invariably take on the 
additional responsibility of representing the island before the national gov-
ernment and of representing the national government on the island in a way 
that confuses their prime municipal role of local service provider. The cen-
tral government has tried to address the issue in its decentralisation policy, 
which asks island municipalities to undertake more tasks at the local level 
and to define their island vision for development. To this end it is distribut-
ing more of the national budget to them and more power to mobilise finan-
cial resources. Yet the policy is not totally successful, since the central gov-
ernment is also keen to represent itself, rather than have the municipalities 
do it. Hence it has recently been moving to reinforce its presence on each 
island with a combined ministry access point. Like most central govern-
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ments, it does not find local autonomy and initiative an easy governance 
policy to adhere to. 
Tourism 
Getting macro-economic policies right is a key challenge for the government 
policy makers. Much of the economic growth has been based in the tourist 
sector, which accounts for 95 per cent of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). 
Tourism has grown between 18-25 per cent over the last few years; four 
international airports have been built since 2005; and visitors are now at 
300,000 per annum. The government is well aware of the dangers of over-
reliance on a single industry, especially one as volatile as tourism in a highly 
competitive market and in the context of a global recession. Within the 
sector itself it is seeking to diversify its countries of origin of investment; its 
location beyond the islands of Sal, Boa Vista and Santiago; and its tourist 
products from sun and sand to rural and cultural, and from cheaper to more 
luxury products. This may benefit the tourist industry, but if the economy 
does not diversify beyond tourism, national economic growth will be fragile. 
Though some in the government speak of attracting one million visitors by 
2020, it is hard to imagine a population of 530,000 being able to absorb such 
numbers without social, infrastructural and environmental problems, and 
without large scale migrant labour with its associated challenges. It would 
also require very large investment in the infrastructure.  
With very real fears that further and persistent growth is not sustainable 
or even desirable, the government is looking at economic alternatives. The 
best hope may be to create a regional hub for transport, maritime, financial 
and IT (information technology) services. If it can attract trans-continental 
air traffic with its four international airports, maritime supply and repairs 
with new roll-on roll-off facilities and new Chinese money in ship building, 
the economy will have a much brighter future. Off-shore financial services 
are also being contemplated. Determined not to be a money laundering 
economy, the government is seeking a regulatory system that maximises the 
benefits and minimises the drawbacks.  
The Motivation for Good Governance 
What is apparent in this account is that, though good governance in terms 
of efficient and accountable and transparent public administration and ser-
vices is difficult to impose on governments, it is achievable when there is a 
political will. 
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The evidence from Cape Verde suggests that external actors, whether 
donors or the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), have 
correctly identified the fight against corruption, a key factor in development, 
but not yet the correct solution for the entire continent. Good governance 
does appear to be a significant contributory factor behind Cape Verde’s 
success, but it is largely an endogenous process not an exogenous one. 
Though the degree of sincerity in the motives driving their governance 
agenda cannot be ascertained, at the very least it can be said that the political 
class have recognised that it is in Cape Verde’s self-interest to promote it. 
Externally driven programmes will continue to be commonly undermined if 
the political commitment is absent; and aid “carrots” may not be enough. 
Persuasion in terms of self-interest and support for the willing may be a 
more profitable approach than cajoling the unwilling or unenthusiastic. 
The Future 
Faced with a lack of natural resources Cape Verde has made good govern-
ance one of its most marketable products. The government could have 
played the role of worthy beggars with nothing to feed themselves with; the 
victims of no resources, cruel slavery, negligent colonisation and isolated 
location. Instead they have chosen the path of offering what so few can 
offer in Africa – good public management and political stability. 
It is good governance that has formed the basis of the special relation-
ship with the EU. It is this that is the attraction to outside investors. It is 
this that won the approval of the IMF and with it access to new windows of 
credit. It is this that won from the World Bank a $10 million poverty reduc-
tion credit in 2007 to support good governance, develop human capital, and 
improve access to social services and $3 million in additional financing to 
support the implementation of the Cape Verde Growth and Competitive-
ness Programme. It is this that has attracted $110 million from the US Mil-
lennium Challenge Compact (MCC) for 2005-10.8 As the MCC said:  
“The size and depth of the program is a recognition of Cape Verde’s 
strong record of democratic governance, intolerance of corruption, 
commitment to supporting and promoting private sector activity, and 
                                                 
8  For improving water management and soil conservation on the islands of Santo 
Antão, Fogo, and São Nicolau; improving transportation networks through road 
and bridge infrastructure on the islands of Santiago and Santo Antão; upgrading the 
Port of Praia; and reforming the financial sector. Cape Verde has embraced MCC 
principles. See: <http://www.mcc.gov/countries/capeverde/index.php>. 
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effective use of limited resources to address the needs of its people in 
a sustainable way”.9  
It is good governance that has given them their top US rating for air security 
that permits airfreight to Boston direct. It is this, if anything, that will deter 
organised crime. Good governance is Cape Verde’s most valuable product. 
But success has a downside. At a World Bank meeting in October 2008 
for eight sub-Saharan MICs, the bank noted MIC vulnerability to the inter-
national lending meltdown, which may make it harder for these countries to 
access credit. Also, because MICs are more closely tied to international mar-
kets than LDCs, the “risk of contagion” to the financial crisis is thought to 
be higher. 
So, will the successful formula of the past decade prove sufficient for 
the future? As indicated above, Cape Verde has serious challenges from 
organised crime. Drugs and money laundering may be in the process of 
being curbed by better coastal protection and tougher laws, but no one 
thinks that the demand for drugs in Europe is going to cease or that drug 
money will not continue to be a powerful temptation. Cape Verde’s midway 
location between South America and Europe and its increasing international 
transport connections will continue to offer advantages to drug traffickers. 
Rising urban crime may well be associated with drug trafficking, and the use 
of the military police shows the difficulties in trying to curb this trend. Or-
ganised crime, then, could yet contaminate the government, the economy, 
social harmony and people’s health.  
There is no country that is not experiencing the impact of the global 
recession. Is a small island state, dependent on the surplus wealth of Euro-
peans and others, more vulnerable than most? Cape Verde faces a recession 
with the economy expected to grow by 0.5 percent in 2009 compared to the 
seven per cent growth of 2008, according to the Ministry of Finance. The 
gradual shift up-market of its tourist products may possibly confirm that 
“you can always sell luxury”. It is encouraging that the IMF, having exam-
ined the public finances, can conclude that the measures adopted by the 
government to confront the global financial crisis merited their “complete 
approval”.10  
Yet though good governance may put in place the best protective 
measures, there is no guarantee that they will be enough. Take for example 
remittances from the 510,000 Diaspora. They alone currently amount to 
more than 12-15 per cent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), or US$137m 
                                                 
9  <http://www.mcc.gov/countries/capeverde/index.php>. 
10  A Semana online 10.6.2008, cf.: <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/17240.html>, 
access: 21 December 2009. 
  146 Bruce Baker 
 
in 2006. Will the scale of remittances continue through the turn-down and 
as successive generations weaken their ties with Cape Verde? The World 
Bank has said that remittance income in developing countries will decline by 
about 1 percent from 2008 to 2009 and possibly up to 6 percent.11 Will that 
drop be replaced by international investment? The economy in Cape Verde 
has done very well in recent years, but imbalances persist in public accounts 
despite the tight fiscal policy. External accounts, for instance, are structurally 
in deficit, due to insufficiently diversified products. The import of capital 
goods as well as the purchase of oil and foodstuff remains high. Up until 
2008 a major source of aid has been the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), a lending organisation for poor countries. Since 2001, the IFC has 
given Cape Verde almost $100 million in low-interest loans to build roads 
and provide social services. But now that it has graduated to a MIC, the 
loans will not be available. With the ongoing global financial crisis this is not 
a good time to be selling off key international transport businesses like 
ENAPORT( the Port of Cape Verde Authority) and TACV (the national 
airline), as was planned. Nor is it a good time for expansion in the off-shore 
banking sector, which was part of the government’s diversification pro-
gramme.  
For all the evidence of the country’s good governance, they have by no 
means conquered poverty and unemployment. The World Bank estimates 
that between 2004-07 the population living in absolute poverty declined 
from 49 per cent to 37 percent, but that still leaves at least 47,000 people in 
a country of 500,000.12 About 10 per cent are severely malnourished and 
have less than US$0.65 a day to buy food, and about 25 per cent do not 
have regular access to safe drinking water, according to government re-
ports.13 The fact is that, despite good governance, the majority of jobs still 
do not pay a liveable wage, so that most workers with families rely on sec-
ond jobs and extended family support.  
Given the link between youth unemployment, that is fuelling crime, 
and drug selling, the fact that according to 2005 government data, 48 per 
cent of youth between the ages of 15-24 were unemployed, is a dangerously 
high level. It remains to be seen if the May 2008 government anti-poverty 
strategy that sought to address youth unemployment by, inter alia, giving 
companies tax incentives to hire youths, will make any difference. With the 
escape valve of migration abroad closing, it makes the challenge even 
harder. 
                                                 
11  IRIN 11 November 2008. 
12  See: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08242.pdf>. 
13  IRIN 30 January 2009. The report used 2002 data. 
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The next few years of the world financial crisis will show whether mar-
keting good governance is enough and whether this is the model for small 
resource developing states.  
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Kap Verde: Die Vermarktung von Good Governance 
Zusammenfassung: Der Inselstaat Kap Verde hat seine Anstrengungen zu 
guter Regierungsführung (Good Governance) erfolgreich demonstriert. Parallel 
zur Institutionalisierung demokratischer Regierungsstrukturen wurde die Ver-
waltung reformiert und modernisiert, wenn auch immer noch Problemberei-
che erkennbar sind. Der Autor sieht insbesondere in den politischen und 
administrativen Reformen den Hintergrund für die erfolgreiche soziale, wirt-
schaftliche und politische Entwicklung dieser kleinen Inselrepublik. Aber wird 
dieses Rezept, das im vergangenen Jahrzehnt seine Wirksamkeit beweisen 
konnte, auch in Zukunft ausreichend sein? Armut und Unterbeschäftigung 
sind keineswegs besiegt. Ein Großteil des Wirtschaftswachstums basiert auf 
dem Tourismussektor; die Regierung ist sich der Gefahr wohl bewusst, die in 
zu großer Abhängigkeit von einem einzigen Wirtschaftszweig liegt. Die geo-
graphische Lage der Inseln auf dem Weg von Südamerika nach Europa und 
die zunehmenden internationalen Transportverbindungen werden weiterhin 
von Drogenhändlern benutzt. Die kommenden Jahre der Weltfinanzkrise 
werden erweisen, ob das bisherige Erfolgsrezept Good Governance als 
Modell für Entwicklungsländer mit geringen eigenen Ressourcen gelten kann. 
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